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THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS

BY WILLIAM W. GOODWIN

IN 1885 I published an article on the Battle of Salamis, which was the result of frequent visits to Salamis and the Attic shores opposite the island, made during my residence in Athens as Director of the American School of Classical Studies in 1882-1883.¹ The view of land and water which these memorable scenes present to-day is essentially the same as that on which Xerxes looked when he took his seat on Mt. Aegaleos on that eventful September morning in 480 B.C. which decided the fate of Greece. The barren island of Psyttaleia, one of the central points in the battle; the rough Silenian rocks, at the end of the long sharp point of Salamis, where "Artembares, leader of ten-thousand horse,"² found his grave; the hill on which the town of Salamis stood, in its commanding position, boldly projecting into the bay; the rocky and inhospitable coast of the mainland of Attica, with its steep height of Aegaleos rising opposite the town; the bright clear waters of the straits of Salamis, still as ready as of old to change from a glassy calm to a lively swell in the morning sea-breeze;³—all these are still familiar sights to every one who sails or rows from the Piraeus over to the bay of Salamis.

In the article of 1885, my chief object was to show that the common account of the battle, supposed to be founded on Herodotus, according to which the greater part of the Persian fleet was brought into the straits of Salamis during the night before the battle, and drawn up along the Attic shore before daybreak, is entirely wrong, and that the Persian fleet did not enter the straits until just before the battle began in the morning. I also maintained that Herodotus did not intend to give this view of the Persian movements. Most modern writers suppose the


¹ Papers of the American School of Classical Studies in Athens, Vol. I, pp. 239-262.

² Aesch. *Pers.* 302.

³ Plutarch, *Them.* 14.

PANORAMIC VIEW OF THE STRAITS AND BAY OF SALAMIS, FROM MOUNT AEGALEOS.
From Ravellinson's Herodotus, by permission.

SOUTH.




Coast of Attica.

[Join.]

P. *Island of Pyttaleia.* C...C. *Point of Salamis (Cynosoura).*

WEST.



S...S. *Toron of Salamis.* G. *Island of St. George.* sh. *Shoal.*

Salamis.


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Persian ships to have been drawn up (often in three lines) directly opposite the Greeks, extending from the entrance of the gulf of Eleusis almost to the entrance of the Piraeus. Indeed it is generally assumed that the principal movement by which the Persians hoped to cut off the escape of the Greeks from Salamis, after Xerxes had been deceived by the crafty message of Themistocles, consisted in bringing a large part of their fleet into this position. It is said that, under cover of the night and without the knowledge of the Greeks, they rowed several hundred ships quietly through the narrow passages between the Attic coast and the two opposite points of Psyttaleia and Salamis, and formed their line along the main land, until their northern wing was pushed beyond Aegaleos so as to close the passage into the gulf of Eleusis.¹ If this movement, which is commonly supposed to be an essential feature in the account of Herodotus, is once admitted, the plan of the next day's battle becomes very simple. The Greeks, who had spent the night on shore at Salamis, would have embarked on their ships soon after day-break and formed their line in the bay of Salamis directly in the face of the enemy; so that little would have remained but for each fleet to advance a few hundred yards and engage the opposite enemy. It is therefore the fundamental question whether this night movement of the Persians really took place,—whether, in short, the Persian fleet entered the straits of Salamis at all before the morning of the battle.

Since the publication of my article on Salamis, I have been unexpectedly gratified by many expressions of approval from scholars of high authority. I may mention Professor Percy Gardner, of Oxford, who in his *New Chapters of Greek History*, Clarendon Press, 1892, gives a conspicuous place to my argument on the site of the battle; Dr. G. B. Grundy, of Oxford, who warmly approves of my view of the battle, but thinks that Herodotus gives a wrong account of it;² Dr. A. R.

¹ Grote, V, p. 172, says: "During the night, a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from Peiraeus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round to the north of the town and harbour of Salamis, so as to shut up the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis." See Grote's map, with the Persian fleet in three lines. See also Cox, *Hist. of Greece*, I, p. 534, and especially the opposite map, with the supposed positions of the two fleets marked. Curtius, *Griech. Gesch.* II, p. 69, though he is less explicit, seems to take the same view.

² *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XVII, 230-240.



A . . . B, Greek line at beginning of battle. C . . . D, Persian front line at beginning of battle.

E . . . F . . . G, Persian line of blockade (in the night)

Munro, of Oxford, who refers to my article and agrees with its general conclusions, while he rejects the opposing view (as he deems it) of Herodotus;¹ and especially A. Milchhöfer, *Erläuternder Text zu Curtius u. Kaupert's Karten von Attika*, Berlin, 1895, VII-VIII, pp. 26, 27, who not only agrees with me in regard to the topography of the battle, but also thinks that the language of Herodotus can, without emendation or forcible interpretation, be reconciled with that of Aeschylus. Dr. Evelyn Abbott, in his *History of Greece* (London, 1892), Part II, p. 184, places the right wing of the Persians, just before the battle, outside of the outlet between Salamis and Attica, referring to my article as showing the improbability of the common view. Thirlwall appears not to have thought of the Persians being in the inner bay at all. He says (II, 301, ed. of 1838): "One line stretched from Cynosura to the Attic port of Munychia." Holm, *Hist. of Greece*, II, p. 63, note (Engl. trans.), after remarking that he has not seen my paper, says: "I confess that I do not think the question as to the position of the Persian ships at the beginning of the action has been satisfactorily determined." In the text he had taken the common view.

I must refer with special interest to an elaborate essay on the battle by Lieut. Pericles Rhediades of the Royal Greek Navy, who was stationed for a long time at the navy-yard just north of the hill of Salamis, where he had ample opportunity to study the topography in the light of all the ancient authorities. He unhesitatingly approves my general view of the battle, and I have now modified this in some important details in conformity to his high authority.²

The only expression of disagreement with the views of my article which I have seen is in the paper on *Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis*, in the *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, Vol. XXXIII (1902), pp. 127-138, by my friend, Benj. Ide Wheeler, President of the University of California. I shall have frequent occasion to allude to this carefully written paper in the following pages.

Several objections to the common view of the battle suggest themselves at once.

¹ *Ibid.* XXII, 325-332.

² 'Η ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχία, ἀπὸ ναυτικῆς καὶ ἱστορικῆς ἀπόψεως, ὑπὸ Περικλέους Δ. 'Ρεδιάδου, ἀνθυποπλοιάρχου τοῦ Βασιλείου Ναυτικοῦ. 'Εν Αθήναις, 1902.

1. The straits and bay of Salamis are very narrow at some points. The passage between the shore of Attica and Psyttaleia is less than 4000 feet wide. The foot of Aegaleos is hardly 4500 feet from the point of Salamis, and hardly 3500 feet from the island of St. George in the bay north of the town. Moreover, this last passage is broken by a large shoal, which must have been not only very dangerous in night navigation, but also a serious obstruction to naval movements, practically reducing the width of the channel here to about 1800 feet. Can we now believe that the Greek fleet was allowed to form quietly in line of battle in the two passages last mentioned, in the very face of the Persian fleet hardly half a mile distant? It is here a most important point, that our eye-witness, Aeschylus, distinctly implies that it was only after the Greeks had rowed forward some distance from their first position that they were seen by the Persians.¹ Themistocles, we are informed, harangued the Greek crews on the shore of Salamis after day-break, when (on the common theory) the enemy's fleet must have been in plain sight just across the bay. After this the Greeks embarked;² then, after waiting for the arrival of the Aeginetan trireme sent the day before to summon the Aeacidæ from Aegina to their aid,³ or (as Plutarch relates) for the morning sea-breeze to blow,⁴ they began their advance. Is it likely that the Persians, who if they were within the straits were there eager to capture the Greek fleet, which they believed to be anxious to elude them by flight, would have lost this opportunity to anticipate the Spartan tactics at Aegospotami⁵ by seizing the Greek ships while the crews were getting ready to embark, or would have failed at least to attack them before their line of battle could be formed?

2. It is agreed on all hands that the Persian movement, whatever it was, by which the Greeks were actually surrounded and their escape was cut off, was executed by night so secretly and silently that none of the Greeks at Salamis suspected it until they heard of its accomplishment

¹ Aesch. *Pers.* 398: *θοῶς δὲ πάντες ἦσαν ἐκφανεῖς ἰδεῖν*. This point is strongly emphasized by Loeschke, *Fahrb. d. Phil.*, 1877, pp. 29, 30, and by others, especially by Rhediades, pp. 30, 31. See below, p. 96.

² Herod. 8, 83.

³ *Ibid.* 64; 82.

⁴ Plut. *Them.* 14.

⁵ Xen. *Hellen.* 2, 1, 27; Grote, VIII, p. 296.

from Aristides and afterwards from the Tenian deserters.¹ Can we conceive of such carelessness on the part of the Greeks at this momentous crisis, that the long line of Persian ships could have passed directly by their camp and within hearing distance of the town of Salamis without attracting the least attention?² Aristides, it will be remembered, returning from exile at this critical moment, made the passage from Aegina to Salamis during this night with great danger, and immediately informed Themistocles that the Greeks were completely shut in by the enemy. Themistocles saw by this that his stratagem was successful, as he told Aristides. But he shows by his language (as Herodotus³ reports it) that he had no information on the subject before the coming of Aristides: if, however, the chief Persian movement had been made within the bay of Salamis, it could never have escaped his vigilance. Aristides was then introduced to the council of the Greek commanders, to whom he told his story, saying that he had come over from Aegina and had with great difficulty eluded the blockading ships of the enemy, for the whole Greek encampment was encompassed by the ships of Xerxes.⁴ Plutarch quotes Aristides as saying: "The sea about us *and behind us* is full of the enemy's ships";⁵ and he himself relates that the Persian ships "sailed out by night, and surrounded and beset the straits on all sides and the islands."⁶ It seems to me that the expressions of Aristides, like those of Herodotus and Plutarch, plainly refer to a blockade of both outlets of the bay of Salamis, so that the escape of the Greeks was completely cut off on the north as well as on the south; and to the stationing of ships at other points around Salamis. But they

¹ Herod. 8, 82; Plut. *Them.* 12, *Arist.* 8.

² The important question whether there was bright moonlight on the night before the battle is discussed later. See pp. 88-91, below.

³ Herod. 8, 80.

⁴ Herod. 8, 81: *φάμενος ἐξ Αἰγίνης τε ἦκειν καὶ μόγισι ἐκπλῶσαι λαθὼν τοὺς ἐπορμέοντας· περιέχεσθαι γὰρ πᾶν τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ὑπὸ τῶν νεῶν τῶν Ξέρξεω.*

⁵ Plut. *Arist.* 8: *τὸ γὰρ ἐν κύκλῳ καὶ κατόπιν ἥδη πελαγὸς ἐμπέπλησται νεῶν πολεμίων.*

⁶ *Ibid.*: *ὥς γὰρ αἱ βαρβαρικαὶ τριῆρεις νύκτωρ ἀναχθεῖσαι καὶ περιβαλοῦσαι τὸν τε πόρον ἐν κύκλῳ καὶ τὰς νήσους κατεῖχον, οὐδενὸς προειδότες τὴν κύκλωσιν, ἦκεν ὁ Ἀριστείδης, κ.τ.λ.*

cannot reasonably be made to imply anything like filling the straits of Salamis themselves with Persian ships.

3. Aeschylus, Herodotus, and Plutarch concur in the statement that Xerxes landed a body of Persians on Psyttaleia because he thought that this island would be a central point in the sea-fight.¹ This certainly implies that he expected to meet the Greek fleet at the southern outlet of the straits, by which he thought it would attempt to escape. If he had formed his plan to pen the whole Greek fleet into the bay of Salamis by stretching his own ships through the straits beyond Aegaleos, he must have expected that the battle would be fought in the inner bay; and nothing short of a successful breaking of his blockade by the Greeks could have made Psyttaleia the scene of a serious contest. Aeschylus and Herodotus² agree that the Persians on the island were to save Persians and slaughter Greeks who might be driven ashore there in the battle. Herodotus speaks of the probability of both men and wrecks being brought there, since the island lay directly in the line of the expected battle.³ Plutarch says expressly that about Psyttaleia appears *to have been the scene* of the greatest struggle and the hardest fighting.⁴

These general considerations, I maintain, fully justify us in rejecting the idea that the Persian fleet passed the straits during the night, unless we find the most positive testimony in proof of such a movement. Let us now examine the testimony on which our view of the battle must be based.

In Aeschylus we have not only an eye-witness of the battle, but probably an actual combatant. According to Ion of Chios,⁵ a friend of Aeschylus, Pausanias,⁶ and the Medicean Life of Aeschylus,⁷ the poet

¹ Aesch. *Pers.* 441-464; Herod. 8, 76; 95; Plut. *Arist.* 9.

² Aesch. *Pers.* 450-453; Herod. 8, 76.

³ *Ibid.*: ἐν γὰρ δὴ πόρῳ τῆς ναυμαχίας τῆς μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι ἔκειτο ἡ νῆσος.

⁴ Plut. *Arist.* 9: ὁ γὰρ πλείστος ὠθισμὸς τῶν νεῶν καὶ τῆς μάχης τὸ καρτερώτατον ἔοικε περὶ τὸν τόπον ἐκεῖνον γενέσθαι.

⁵ Schol. on Aesch. *Pers.* 429: "Ἴων παρῆναι Αἰσχύλον ἐν τοῖς Σαλαμινιακοῖς φησι. Plutarch, *De Prof. in Virt.* 8, tells of Aeschylus talking familiarly with Ion at the Isthmian games.

⁶ Paus. 1, 14, 5: καὶ πρὸ Ἀρτεμισίου καὶ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχῆσας.

⁷ See p. 2 (Dind.): γενναῖον δὲ αὐτὸν φασὶ καὶ μετασχεῖν τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχης σὺν τῷ ἀδελφῷ Κυνεγεῖρῳ, τῆς τε ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίας σὺν τῷ νεωτάτῳ τῶν ἀδελφῶν Ἀμεινίᾳ, καὶ τῆς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς πεζομαχίας.

fought on one of the Athenian ships at Salamis. In any case his testimony is unimpeachable; and although he is a poet, to whom it would be absurd to look for a detailed and accurate history of the battle, it is at least safe to say that nothing can be accepted as historic which *distinctly contradicts* any plain statement of Aeschylus regarding the contest. In 473-472 B.C., less than eight years after the battle, Aeschylus wrote his tragedy, *The Persians*, in which he puts a most graphic narrative of the fight at Salamis into the mouth of a Persian messenger, who bears the report of the great defeat to Atossa, the mother of Xerxes, at Susa. The account begins (*Pers.* 353) with the crafty message sent by Themistocles to Xerxes, that the Greeks are about to make their escape in the coming night from the bay of Salamis, where their fleet was lying. The King at once orders the officers of his fleet to make two movements to shut up the Greeks within the bay, so that escape shall be impossible. When night shall come, they are first to "station a squadron of ships in three lines, to guard the exits and the rushing straits of the sea" (i. e. the southern outlets of the straits of Salamis), and secondly to station "others round about the island of Ajax."¹ He threatens that, if the Greeks escape this blockade and take to flight, all the commanders shall lose their heads. The crews take their supper on shore, and each rower then sees that his oar is securely lashed to its thole. When night came on, they embark, and sail forth each to his appointed position in the blockade, while the lines of long ships are heard shouting to one another. And they sail to the positions to which each was assigned.² "The masters of the ships kept the whole naval host rowing about (or 'rowing in various directions') all night.

¹ *Pers.* 364-368:

εὖτ' ἂν φλέγων ἀκτῖσιν ἥλιος χθόνα
 λήξῃ, κνέφας δὲ τέμενος αἰθέρος λάβῃ,
 τάξαι νεῶν στῆφος μὲν ἐν στοίχοις τρισίν,
 ἕκπλους φυλάσσειν καὶ πόρους ἀλιρρόθους·
 ἄλλας δὲ κύκλω νῆσον Αἶαντος πέριξ.

V. 367 can refer to nothing but the two outlets from the bay of Salamis, on either side of Psyttaleia. V. 368 is generally referred to sending a large naval force by the west of Salamis to block the passage between Salamis and Megara.

² Aesch. *Pers.* 369-381.

And the night passed on; and nowhere did the Greeks make any attempt to sail out in secret flight.”¹

But when the morning sun illumined the earth with his beams, the Persians were struck with consternation as they heard the war-song chanted by the Greeks and loudly echoed from the rocky hills of Salamis. “Now terror seized all the barbarians, as they were disappointed in their hopes. For it was not for flight that the Greeks were chanting their solemn paeon, but as men rushing into battle with the courage of brave hearts. And the trumpet with its voice fired all their ranks. At once with the united stroke of the dashing oars they smote the deep sea at the word of command. And quickly they all appeared to us in full sight.”²

¹ Pers. 382-385:

καὶ πάννυχτοι δὴ διάπλοον καθίστασαν
ναῶν ἀνακτες πάντα ναυτικὸν λέων.
καὶ νῦν ἐχώρει, κού μάλ’ Ἑλλήνων στρατὸς
κρυφαῖον ἔκπλοον οὐδαμῇ καθίστατο.

Wheeler (pp. 130, 133, 134) thinks that I have misunderstood and misinterpreted these verses of Aeschylus. He explains them thus: “All the night they keep *sailing through*, until, when the night is passed, no place is left for the Greeks to sail out.” While I have not the slightest doubt of the correctness of my own translation, I must leave it to scholars to decide which of us is right. Wheeler (p. 133) says that it is only through my misinterpretation of these lines that I refuse to think that the Persians began to enter the straits before daylight. I hope I have shown that I have many other grounds (though none that are stronger) for this refusal; but I cannot see that he cites any other passage of Aeschylus in support of his opposite opinion than these lines with his own interpretation. Wheeler objects to my explanation of *διάπλοον καθίστασαν*, which he translates *keep sailing through* (i. e. the straits into the bay of Salamis). But *διάπλοος* generally means *sailing across* (from place to place), like *διαπλέω* in Arist. *Vesp.* 123, *διέπλευσεν εἰς Ἀγιναν*, he sailed over to Aegina (from Athens), and *διάπλοον καθίστασαν* here (I think) refers to the sailing of the ships which were destined to different points in the blockade of Salamis in various directions, including those sent to block the passage north of Salamis, which Aristides encountered in his passage from Aegina (see pp. 86, 87). My expression *kept* (them) *rowing about* happens to be Paley’s; while Plumptre gives *rowing to and fro*, Campbell *kept their mariners manoeuvring*, and Blaikie *all night they cruised*. It probably never occurred to any one before Wheeler to refer the words to *passing through the straits*, and it is only by this interpretation that he is able to find a word of Aeschylus to support his main argument.

² Pers. 386-398:

ἐπεὶ γε μέντοι λευκόπῳλος ἡμέρα
πᾶσαν κατέσχε γαῖαν εὐφρογῆς ἰδεῖν,

"Their right wing first led the way in good order, and next the whole fleet advanced; and in loud harmony their shout was heard by us, 'Children of Greeks, advance! free your country, free your children, your wives, the shrines of your fathers' Gods, and the tombs of your ancestors! Now we are to fight for our all.' Then from our side they were met by the din of the Persian tongue, and there was no longer a moment for delay. At once ship against ship dashed its brazen beak. A Greek ship began the attack, and crushed the whole figure-head of a Phoenician; and now each one steered his ship against another. At first the stream of the Persian fleet held its own; but when the multitude of ships were crowded in the narrows so that they could not help each other, and they were themselves struck by the brazen beaks of their own ships, their armament of oars was crushed, while at the same time the Grecian ships right skilfully encircled them and dashed into them from every side. The hulls of their ships were upturned, and the water was no longer to be seen, filled with wrecks and slaughtered men. The shores and rocks were covered with their dead. And now every ship which was left of the barbaric host rowed away in disorderly flight. The Greeks smote and cleft them with pieces of oars and fragments of wrecks, as men spear tunnies or a haul of fish. Their cries overspread the whole sea with wailings, until the eye of dark night bade it all cease. The multitude of ills I could not recount in full, were I to give ten days to my story. But be assured, never in a single day did such a multitude of men perish."¹

πρῶτον μὲν ἤχη κελადος Ἑλλήνων πάρα
 μολπηδὸν ἠυφήμησεν, ὄρθιον δ' ἄμα
 ἀντηλάλαξε νησιώτιδος πέτρας
 ἤχω· φόβος δὲ πᾶσι βαρβάροις παρῆν
 γνώμης ἀποσφαλεῖσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὡς φυγῇ
 παιᾶν' ἐφύμνουν σεμνὸν Ἑλλήνες τότε,
 ἀλλ' ἐς μάχην ὀρμῶντες εὐψύχῳ θράσει·
 σάλπιγξ δ' αὐτῇ πάντ' ἐκεῖν' ἐπέφλεγεν.
 εὐθὺς δὲ κώπης ῥοτιάδος ξυνεμβολῇ
 ἔπαισαν ἄλμην βρύχιον ἐκ κελεύματος·
 θοῶς δὲ πάντες ἦσαν ἐκφανεῖς ἰδεῖν.

For the importance of the last verse see pp. 78 and 96.

¹ Pers. 399-432:

τὸ δεξιὸν μὲν πρῶτον εὐτάκτως κέρας
 400 ἡγείτο κόσμῳ, δεύτερον δ' ὁ πᾶς στόλος

The foregoing is the clear account of Aeschylus of a battle in which he himself took part. It is of course a poet's story, and it omits much of the detail which we should expect from an historian. I think we are safe in maintaining that no account which distinctly contradicts this can be accepted as true. I shall discuss this passage later in connection with the account of Herodotus. But it is perfectly plain that there is nothing here that looks like a line (or three lines) of Persian ships between the town of Salamis and the shore of Attica. On the contrary, we have three lines of ships set by Xerxes to guard the exit of the straits

-
- ἐπεξεχώρει, καὶ παρῇν ὁμοῦ κλύειν
 πολλὴν βοήν· ὦ παῖδες Ἑλλήνων, ἔτε,
 ἐλευθεροῦτε πατρίδ', ἐλευθεροῦτε δὲ
 παῖδας, γυναῖκας, θεῶν τε πατρώων ἔδη
 405 θήκας τε προγόνων· νῦν ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀγών.
 καὶ μὴν παρ' ἡμῶν Περσίδος γλώσσης ῥόθος
 ὑπηντίαζε, κοῦκέτ' ἦν μέλλειν ἀκμή.
 εὐθύς δὲ ναὺς ἐν νηὶ χαλκῆρῃ στόλον
 ἔπαισεν· ἦρξε δ' ἐμβολῆς Ἑλληνικῇ
 410 ναὺς, ἀποθραύει πάντα Φοινίσσης νεῶς
 κόρυμβ', ἐπ' ἄλλην δ' ἄλλος ἡῦθυνεν δόρυ.
 τὰ πρῶτα μέν νυν ῥεῦμα Περσικοῦ στρατοῦ
 ἀντείχεν· ὥς δὲ πλήθος ἐν στενωπῷ νεῶν
 ἤθροιστ', ἀρωγὴ δ' οὔτις ἀλλήλοις παρῇν,
 415 αὐτοὶ δ' ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἐμβόλοις χαλκοστόμοις
 παλόντ', ἔθρανον πάντα κωπήρῃ στόλον.
 Ἑλληνικαὶ τε νῆες οὐκ ἀφρασμόνως
 κύκλῳ πέριξ ἔθεινον, ὑπτιούτο δὲ
 σκάφῃ νεῶν, θάλασσα δ' οὐκέτ' ἦν ἰδεῖν,
 420 ναυαγίων πλήθουσα καὶ φόνου βροτῶν.
 ἀκταὶ δὲ νεκρῶν χοιράδες δ' ἐπλήθουν,
 φυγῇ δ' ἀκόσμῳ πᾶσα ναὺς ἥρσσετο,
 δσαιπερ ἦσαν βαρβάρου στρατεύματος.
 τοὶ δ' ὥστε θύνους ἢ τιν' ἰχθύων βόλον
 425 ἀγαῖσι κωπῶν θραύμασιν τ' ἐρείπῳ
 ἔπαιον, ἐρράχιζον· οὐμωγῇ δ' ὁμοῦ
 κωκύμασιν κατεῖχε πελαγίαν ἄλα,
 ἕως κελαινῆς νυκτὸς δμῇ ἀφείλετο.
 κακῶν δὲ πλήθος, οὐδ' ἂν εἰ δέκ' ἡματα
 430 στοιχηγοροῖν, οὐκ ἂν ἐκπλήσαιμι σοι.
 εἰ γὰρ τόδ' ἴσθι, μηδάμ' ἡμερᾶ μίᾳ
 πλήθος τοσούτῳ ἀνθρώπων θανεῖν.

of Salamis (ἔκπλους φυλάσσειν καὶ πόρους ἀλιρρόθους), which certainly is the same movement as that described by Herodotus in the words, κατεῖχον μέχρι Μουνυχίης πάντα τὸν πορθμὸν τῇσι νηυσί, *they held the whole passage* (evidently from the straits) *to Munychia with their ships*. The movement mentioned by Aeschylus in v. 368, ἄλλας δὲ κύκλῳ νῆσον Αἴαντος πέριξ (sc. τάξαι), *and (set) others round about the island of Ajax*, must include what Diodorus describes as "sending out the Egyptian naval force with orders to block the passage between Salamis and the coast of Megara," which is described in somewhat different language by Herodotus.¹ Vv. 412-414, in which the poet speaks of the *stream* (ῥεύμα) of Persian ships at first holding its own, but afterwards being *crowded in the narrows* (ἐν στενῷ) and falling into hopeless confusion, could never refer to a fleet sailing across from the Attic shore to attack a fleet advancing from the opposite shore of Salamis. This is obviously what Diodorus describes in equally plain language.² Thucydides makes the Athenian orator at Sparta speak of Themistocles as αἰτιώτατος ἐν τῷ στενῷ ναυμαχῆσαι, *chiefly responsible for fighting in the narrows*.³ On the supposition that the Persian fleet was lying along the Attic shore within the straits before daybreak, Aeschylus, Diodorus (i. e. Ephorus), and Thucydides do not give *another account* of the matter; they simply tell an impossible story.

We must next examine the evidence of Herodotus. I shall give a brief abstract of the passages in which he states anything concerning the preparations for the battle or the course of the combat, with the Greek text and a literal translation (in quotation marks) of all which concern the chief question which we are considering.

(Herod. 8, 67, 70, 75.) The Persian fleet came to Phalerum (the old port of Athens) soon after the sea-fight at Artemisium. On the day before the battle of Salamis, Xerxes held a council of war, in which a majority of his leaders voted for another sea-fight. He at once ordered the fleet to move out of the harbor in the direction of Salamis. The ships were drawn up in line, ready for a battle the next day. The Greeks

¹ See Diod. 11, 17; Herod. 8, 76, which is discussed below, p. 92.

² Diod. 11, 18: οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον πλέοντες διετήρουν τὴν τάξιν, ἔχοντες πολλὴν εὐρυχωρίαν· ὥς δ' εἰς τὸ στενὸν ἦλθον, ἡναγκάζοντο τῶν νεῶν τινας ἀπὸ τῆς τάξεως ἀποσπᾶν, καὶ πολλὰν ἐποίουν θόρυβον.

³ Thuc. 1, 74: cf. Plut. *Them.* 14.

in the mean time were alarmed, and Themistocles saw that the majority were likely to vote to abandon Attica to the enemy and sail away to Peloponnesus. The afternoon before the battle, after the Persian fleet had moved towards Salamis, Themistocles secretly sent his faithful slave, Sicinnus, to warn Xerxes and his generals that the Greeks were about to escape with their fleet and to advise them to prevent their flight.

(76.) "The Persian commanders believed this message; and they first landed a large Persian force on the island of Psyttaleia, between Salamis and the mainland. Secondly, when midnight came, they brought their west wing round by a circuit to Salamis, and those who had been stationed about Ceos and Cynosura brought their fleet up, and held the whole passage as far as Munychia with the ships. They thus brought up their ships, that the Greeks might not even be able to take flight, but might be penned up in Salamis and be punished for the way they fought at Artemisium. All this they did in silence, that the enemy might have no knowledge of it. They also landed Persians on Psyttaleia, thinking that both men and wrecks would be carried thither during the battle (for the island lay in the path of the coming sea-fight), that they might rescue their own men and destroy the enemy."¹

(78-82.) Meanwhile there was a great strife of words among the Greek commanders at Salamis. They did not yet know that the barbarians were surrounding them, but thought these were still where they had seen them the day before. While they were disputing, Aristides suddenly arrived, having just crossed over from Aegina. He told Themistocles and afterwards the whole council that escape was impossible, as they were entirely blockaded by the enemy and he had found great difficulty in escaping the ships which he saw on his passage. He

¹ 8, 76: τοῖσι δὲ ὡς πιστὰ ἐγένετο τὰ ἀγγελθέντα, τοῦτο μὲν ἐς τὴν νησιᾶ τὴν Ψυττάλειαν, μεταξύ Σαλαμῖνός τε κειμένην καὶ τῆς ἡπείρου, πολλοὺς τῶν Περσέων ἀπεβίβασαντο. τοῦτο δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο μέσαι νύκτες, ἀνῆγον μὲν τὸ ἀπ' ἐσπέρης κέρας κυκλοῦμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα, ἀνῆγον δὲ οἱ ἀμφὶ τὴν Κέον τε καὶ τὴν Κυνόσουραν τεταγμένοι, κατεῖχόν τε μέχρι Μουνυχίης πάντα τὸν πορθμῶν τῆσι νηυσί· τῶνδε δὲ εἵνεκα ἀνῆγον τὰς νέας, ἵνα δὴ τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴδὲ φυγεῖν ἔξῃ, ἀλλ' ἀπολαμφθέντες ἐν τῇ Σαλαμῖνι δοῖεν τίσιν τῶν ἐπ' Ἀρτεμισίῳ ἀγωνισμάτων. ἐς δὲ τὴν νησιᾶ τὴν Ψυττάλειαν καλεομένην ἀπεβίβασιν τῶν Περσέων τῶνδε εἵνεκεν, ὥς ἐπεὰν γίνηται ναυμαχίη, ἐνταῦθα μάλιστα ἐξοισομένων τῶν τε ἀνδρῶν καὶ τῶν ναυαγίων (ἐν γὰρ δὴ πόρῳ τῆς ναυμαχίης τῆς μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι ἔκειτο ἡ νῆσος), ἵνα τοὺς μὲν περιποιέωσι τοὺς δὲ διαφθέρωσι. ἐποίηεν δὲ σιγῇ ταῦτα, ὥς μὴ πυνθανοῖατο οἱ ἐναντίοι.

urged them to make ready for defence. The commanders still refused to believe the story, until a Tenian ship, which had deserted from the Persian fleet, arrived with the same news. Themistocles now saw that his crafty device of sending his messenger to Xerxes had succeeded.

(83, 84.) The Greeks now prepared for the battle. The day dawned, and Themistocles harangued the crews on the shore. They then embarked, and just then the ship arrived from Aegina which had been sent thither to bring the images of the Aeacidae (see 8, 64). They rowed out with all their ships; and as they were putting to sea, the Persians at once moved to attack them (*ἐπεκάρτο*). Some of the Greeks (not the Athenians) now (in a slight panic) began to back water and were minded to beach their ships, when suddenly an Athenian captain, Aminias, dashed forward with his ship before the line, and engaged a Persian ship. The two ships became so entangled that they could not be separated, whereupon the whole fleet came to help Aminias, and the battle was begun. . . . It is reported that the phantom of a woman appeared (at the moment of the panic) and cried out, so that all the Greeks could hear, "Ye good men, how far are you going to back water?"

For the first lines in 85, *κατὰ δὲ . . . τὸν Πειραιέα*, see the discussion in pp. 99, 100, where the passage is quoted.

(86.) Most of the Persian ships at Salamis were disabled by either the Athenians or the Aeginetans. For the Greeks fought in good order and in line, while the Persians did not keep their line or do anything with any sense, so that the issue could not have been other than it was.¹

(89.) The Persian admiral, a brother of Xerxes, was killed, with many other notable Persians.² Only a few Greeks perished, for when their ships were destroyed they could swim to Salamis. But most of the Persians in such cases were drowned, as they could not swim. When the front line of Persian ships was put to flight, most of them were destroyed; for those behind them, striving to push forward that they

¹ 8, 86: *ἅτε γὰρ τῶν μὲν Ἑλλήνων σὺν κόσμῳ ναυμαχεόντων κατὰ τάξιν, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων οὔτε τεταγμένων ἔτι οὔτε σὺν νόῳ ποιεόντων οὐδέν, ἔμελλε τοιοῦτό σφι συνοίσεσθαι ὅλον περ ἀπέβη.*

² 8, 89. See Diod. II, 17: *ὁ δὲ ναύαρχος προηγούμενος τῆς τάξεως καὶ πρῶτος συνάψας μάχην διεφθάρη λαμπρῶς ἀγωνισάμενος.*

might make a show of valor before the king, became entangled with their own ships which were trying to escape.

(91 and 93.) When the barbarians were in flight towards Phalerum, the Aeginetans posted themselves in the channel and did notable deeds. For in the tumult of the battle the Athenians disabled the Persian ships which either made resistance or took to flight, while the Aeginetans dealt with those which succeeded in passing the straits: and when any escaped the Athenians, they fell at once into the hands of the Aeginetans. . . . The Aeginetans gained the greatest glory in the battle, and next to them were the Athenians.

(95.) The slaughter of the Persians on Psyttaleia by Aristides after the battle is merely mentioned.

(96.) After the battle, the Greeks towed to Salamis the wrecks which were in that neighborhood. But a west wind carried many over to Cape Colias, near Phalerum.

I have attempted to give all that I find in Herodotus bearing on the questions which we are now considering. I fail to see in his scattered narratives anything like Wheeler's "continuous, consistent, and well-considered account" of the battle.¹ Least of all can I find any passage which, fairly interpreted with the help of other accounts, gives any ground for the common belief that Herodotus meant to represent the Persian fleet as drawn up along the Attic shore opposite the town of Salamis on the morning of the battle.

Before proceeding further, I must examine the tradition that the battle was fought at about the time of full moon. In the fragment ascribed to Plutarch, *On the Glory of the Athenians*, we have (§ 7) a mention of the sacrifice to Artemis on the 16th of Munychion, ἐν ᾗ τοῖς Ἕλλησι περὶ Σαλαμῖνα νικῶσιν ἐπέλαμψεν ἡ θεὸς πανσέληνος. This date is that of the festival of Artemis Munychia, in which a commemoration of Salamis was included. Plutarch gives the real date of the battle in his life of Camillus (§ 19), ἐν δὲ Σαλαμῖνι (sc. ἐνίκων)

¹ Dr. Munro goes so far as to say (p. 326): "Herodotus has collected a miscellaneous store of anecdotes, but every attentive reader must see that he has little idea of the operations as a whole." He probably found it difficult to obtain trustworthy and consistent accounts from the survivors of the battle: he admits this distinctly in 8, 87.

περὶ τὰς εἰκάδας, i. e. about the 20th of Boedromion (our September).¹ The "divine Full Moon of Salamis" points to a common tradition. The full moon of September, 480 B.C., fell on the 18th (by our reckoning), and the moon was eclipsed on that night. We have thus a strong probability that the night before the battle was moonlit, and this adds to the improbability (not to say the impossibility) of the Persians arraying their immense fleet along the Attic shore without the suspicion of the Greeks less than a mile distant.

Wheeler (p. 134) objects vigorously to my opinion that the battle followed a moonlight night; but he gives no grounds for his objection except a reference to Aeschylus (*Pers.* 365) and to Busolt's argument on this question. But κνέφας in *Pers.* 365 and 357 is merely a poetic expression for *night*, without regard to the presence or absence of the moon. Busolt frankly admits that in a clear moonlight night the movement of the Persians to the supposed position could not have been made without the knowledge of the Greeks; and it is therefore for him a vital matter to prove that the night was dark.² Busolt's is, so far as I know, the only argument which attempts to prove that the battle took place as late as the 27th or 28th of September, i. e. only four or five days before the new moon. He bases this entirely on Hdt. 9, 10, where the solar eclipse of October 2d is said to have prevented Cleombrotus from marching with his Spartan army from the isthmus of Corinth into Boeotia to join in cutting off the retreat of Xerxes. According to Herodotus (8, 113), Xerxes began to evacuate Attica "a few days" (ὀλίγας ἡμέρας) after the battle of Salamis. Busolt allows four (or at most five) days for Xerxes to make up his mind to retreat and to prepare his army to march, and for Cleombrotus to get the news of this and to decide to march into Boeotia. This would (he thinks) give September 27th or 28th (probably the latter) for the battle.

It will be noticed that this argument depends entirely on the assumption that the ὀλίγας ἡμέρας of Herodotus cannot cover more than four or five days. Let us see what Herodotus himself tells us of what happened in this period. When Xerxes became aware of the extent of his defeat, he made his plans to retreat to Asia by land. But fearing

¹ A. Mommsen, *Chronologie*, 104, 105.

² Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, II, 702-704.

that the Greeks might hasten to destroy his bridge over the Hellespont, he tried to prevent either the Greeks or his own army from suspecting this, and he succeeded in deceiving everybody except his trusty general, Mardonius.¹ During this time he could not even begin to prepare for his march. To conceal his plan, he began to build a huge dam from the Attic shore to Salamis, making a temporary passage by lashing together Phoenician merchant ships to serve as a bridge and as a protection to the workmen. He also began new warlike preparations, to make the Greeks believe that he was planning another sea-fight; and it was universally thought that he was determined to remain and carry on the war. Mardonius, who alone had suspected a retreat, now came to Xerxes, and advised him either to invade the Peloponnesus, or else, if he was bent on returning to Persia, to leave him with 300,000 chosen men to undertake the conquest of Greece. Xerxes was pleased with the latter plan; and he consulted his councillors, especially Artemisia, whose advice he greatly valued. The Queen advised him to accept the plan of Mardonius, which he did. He entrusted his children to Artemisia to convey them to Ephesus while he marched to Asia with his army.² In the following night he sent his fleet with all speed to the Hellespont, to secure the safety of the bridge. The next day, the Greeks prepared for a sea-fight, never doubting that the Persian fleet was still at Phalerum. When they found that it had departed in the night, they set out with their own fleet in pursuit. But when they saw nothing of the Persian ships after passing the south point of Euboea, they landed at Andros and held a council. Themistocles urged them strongly to sail at once to the Hellespont and destroy the bridge; but the Peloponnesian captains opposed this vigorously, and besought the Greeks to do nothing to keep the Persians in their country but to make their escape as easy as possible. Themistocles now professed to agree with this opinion, and he persuaded the Athenians to follow him. But he was crafty enough to use this crisis to secure for himself the favor of Xerxes, with a view to his future necessities; and he sent his slave Sicinnus again to the King secretly, to inform him that he had prevented the Greeks from breaking the bridge and pursuing his fleet; and he wished him a peaceful return to Persia.³ It was after these various

¹ Hdt. 8, 97.² Hdt. 8, 100-103.³ *Ibid.* 107-110.

occurrences that Xerxes and his army left Attica for Boeotia and Thessaly.

This account shows how we are to understand the "few days" between the battle and the march of Xerxes. Does anyone think that ten days would be too long a time to allow for these events? Cleombrotus at the Isthmus could hardly have heard anything about the retreat of Xerxes which would have caused him to consult the sacrifices to see whether he should march in pursuit of him, until he heard that the Persian fleet had sailed from Phalerum. I can see nothing in the date of the sacrifice of Cleombrotus on the second of October to induce us to give the battle a later date than the 22d or even the 21st of September. The night before the battle would then have been illumined by a bright moon, only two or three days after the full, rising before eight o'clock. But the moon does not *compel* us to place the battle earlier than the 26th (only one day before Busolt's 27th), for the moon of the 25th rose at about ten o'clock, and the Persian movements did not begin until midnight.¹ But I am more inclined to adopt a much earlier date, either the 21st or the 22d. I therefore accept the tradition of the "divine full moon of Salamis"; but I use it only as an additional argument, confirming one which seems to me perfectly conclusive without this help.

I have dwelt on this question at such length especially, because Busolt, who bases his chief argument on the darkness of the night, frankly admits that by clear moonlight the supposed movements of the Persians could not have escaped the knowledge of the Greeks,² while Wheeler bases almost his entire argument against the moonlight night on Busolt's.

I will now attempt to give an account of the Persian movements during the day and night before the battle and of the battle itself, based

¹ Busolt seems to forget that the moon in question was the Harvest Moon, which a week after the full rose about four hours after sunset. He gives one minute after midnight for the rising of the moon September 25, instead of ten P.M.; and for the following nights 12.58 and 1.55, the correct times being 10.50 and 11.42. See any almanac for the rising of the September moon when the full moon comes near the equinox, as it did in September, 480 B.C.

² *Griech. Gesch.* II, 702: Bei hellem Mondlicht hätte die Bewegung den Hellenen nicht unbemerkt bleiben können.

on my understanding of the passages of Aeschylus and Herodotus which I have quoted or described. To this will be added such evidence as is to be found in Plutarch or Diodorus (who is here merely repeating Ephorus and so giving testimony less than a century later than that of Herodotus), when this evidence confirms, expands, or explains that of Herodotus or Aeschylus.

The Persians at Phalerum the day before the battle decided to risk another sea-fight, and they brought out their fleet towards Salamis, and arranged them in line of battle ready for a sea-fight the next day.¹ The same day the Greeks, probably alarmed by the Persian movement, became more than ever inclined to abandon Salamis and to sail away to Peloponnesus. Themistocles, to frustrate this design, secretly sent to Xerxes late in the afternoon, to warn him of the intended flight of the Greeks and to urge him to prevent it.² The Persian commanders immediately took measures to blockade the Greeks in Salamis and to cut off their retreat if one should be attempted during the coming night. They at once landed a strong force on Psyttaleia, which they thought would be in the midst of the coming battle. When midnight came, they made two important movements to blockade the Greeks and to prevent them from escaping either by the north channel between Salamis and Megara or by the two narrow passages on either side of Psyttaleia. First, they sent their west wing round Salamis on the west side to block the north passage between the island and Megara. Secondly, they stationed the rest of their fleet, "in three lines, to guard the outlets and the rushing straits of the sea" (as Aeschylus says), — or "they occupied the whole channel as far as Munychia with their ships" (as Herodotus gives it). Both writers say that these movements of ships were made to prevent the Greeks from escaping.³ About the former of these movements there is substantial agreement, as *κύκλω νῆσον Αἶαντος πέριξ* in Aeschylus and *κυκλούμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμίνα* evidently refer to the same circuitous passage around the island; and this is confirmed by the plain statement of Diodorus,⁴ that Xerxes sent out the Egyptian

¹ Hdt. 8, 67 and 70.

² *Ibid.* 75.

³ *Ibid.* 76.

⁴ Diod. II, 17: εὐθὺς οὖν τὸ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ναυτικὸν ἐξέπεμψε, προστάξας ἐμφράττειν τὸν μεταξὺ πόρον τῆς τε Σαλαμῖνος καὶ τῆς Μεγαρίδος χώρας.

naval force to block the passage between Salamis and Megara, and that of Plutarch,¹ that 200 ships were sent out as a blockading force, while Herodotus gives 200 as the Egyptian contingent.² I cannot see how any one can find in these accounts any suggestion of the main Persian fleet being sent up through the straits to the Attic coast opposite the town of Salamis, while *ἐκπλους φυλάσσειν καὶ πόρους ἀλιρρόθους* in Aeschylus positively contradicts any such idea. Opposite Salamis town there were surely no "outlets" and no "rushing straits of the sea," which are found only in the two channels separating Psyttaleia from Salamis and the Piraeus (or Munychia). To the latter of these *μέχρι Μουνυχίης πάντα τόν πορθμόν* in Herodotus must refer, unless *πορθμόν* can mean the whole passage between Salamis and Attica in which Psyttaleia lies.

We may therefore assume that the main Persian blockading fleet, at daybreak on the morning of the battle, was stretched from the south-western point of Piraeus westward, south of Psyttaleia, to near the shore of Salamis, so as to block effectually the two channels into the inner bay. See the map.

These movements probably occupied the greater part of the time

¹ Plut. *Them.* 12: *διακοσίαις δ' ἀναχθέντας ἤδη περιβαλέσθαι τὸν πόρον ἐν κύκλῳ πάντα καὶ διαῶσαι τὰς νήσους, ὅπως ἐκφύγοι μηδεὶς τῶν πολεμίων.*

² 7, 89. It is doubtful whether there were any Egyptians in the battle. Aesch. *Pers.* 311 and 321 and Hdt. 8, 100, are quoted as authority for their presence. But the vague allusion in Herodotus, where Mardonius tells Xerxes that it is no disgrace to the real Persians "if Phoenicians and Egyptians, Cyprians and Cilicians, proved cowards," can hardly be called evidence of the actual presence of Egyptians (in any numbers, or at all) at Salamis. The supposed evidence of Aeschylus is rather comic. "Arcteus, who dwells near the sources of the Egyptian Nile" (?), is mentioned in 311 among the victims of the sea-fight, being one of four "who fell from the same ship" (313). Arcteus himself is called leader of the "luxurious Lydians" in 44; and two of his fellow-sufferers, Adeues and Pheresseues, are said by the scholiast to have names which are not of the Egyptian style, but poetic inventions. Ariomardus, who is called in 38 "ruler of Ogygian Thebes," is said in 321 to have brought mourning upon Sardes by his untimely death. We must remember that Persian officers did not always command the troops of their own country, and also that high-sounding names which fitted the anapaestic verse must have been at a high premium when Aeschylus was writing the *πάροδος* of *The Persians*. See Hermann's note on *Pers.* 316, which ends thus: *Quare maneat posthac Aeschyli Ariomardo et imperium Aegyptiorum et patria Sardes.* These Egyptians certainly seem a little mixed!

from midnight to daybreak. Especially the ships which were sent round to the north by the west of Salamis kept the sea on that side for a long time so "full of Persians" that Aristides had a hazardous and difficult passage from Aegina to Salamis, being unable to avoid the various squadrons and so obliged to sail between them as best he could. He described "the sea around and behind the Greeks as filled by the enemy's ships," so that there was no hope of escape.¹ Of course the only Persian ships which he thus directly encountered were those between Salamis and Aegina, which all belonged to the west wing sent to the north; but as he approached Salamis he could see the more distant movement of the main Persian fleet, as it was moving to the points of the blockade near Psyttaleia, which showed him that all escape by the straits of Salamis was also cut off.² To suppose that Aristides reported the great Persian fleet as entering the inner bay opposite the town of Salamis is to assume that the Greeks took no notice of this dangerous movement and did not even take immediate action to protect their smaller fleet in the harbor, which would then have been an easy prey to the Persians. On the contrary, the Greek commanders refused to believe the story of Aristides until the Tenian deserters confirmed his report. This shows that they could not have settled the question by simply going to the point of the island, as they would have done if they had been told that the Persian fleet was in the inner bay.

The complete blockade was thus known to the Greeks before daybreak; and their scouts must have reported the exact position of each part of the blockading fleet. Their cool behavior after daybreak shows that they did not then see a fleet of twice the size of their own lying directly opposite on the Attic shore. Instead of hastening to their ships to defend them, they assembled on the shore and listened to a speech of Themistocles, of which Herodotus gives an elaborate account, showing that it was no short or hasty harangue.³ They then embarked

¹ Hdt. 8, 81: μόγῃς ἐκπλῶσαι λαθὼν τοὺς ἐπορμέοντας. Plut. *Arist.* 8: ἀπ' Ἀιγίνης παραβόλῃς διὰ τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν διεκπλεύσας.

² Aristides coming from Aegina would naturally have steered first for the straits of Salamis, until he saw that these were to be blockaded. *Pers.* 382, 383 (p. 81) represent the lively movements of the Persians as they were preparing for the various blockades.

³ Hdt. 8, 83.

and rowed out to meet the enemy. Herodotus tells us that while they were putting to sea the Persians advanced against them. Aeschylus is more explicit: he says that the right wing first advanced in good order; this contained the Lacedaemonians and others who had been in the bay south of the town. Then the rest of the fleet advanced, composed in great part of the 280 Athenian ships: these had been in the north bay. Herodotus mentions a brief panic which arose when the Persian fleet was just about to meet them. Some of "the other Greeks" (i. e. not Athenians, who are at once mentioned as not concerned in the panic) began to back water and were about to beach their ships. These were probably a few ships on the right wing which were just passing the point of Cynosura; and on suddenly catching sight of the Persians beyond the point advancing rapidly towards them, the men were tempted to make for the shore and escape. The apparition of a woman who appeared and remonstrated with these frightened crews was probably thought to have stood on the point. This little panic occurred just before the two fleets met; and it was suddenly stopped by the brave act of the Athenian Aminias, who dashed forward with his ship in advance of the line and attacked a Phoenician ship, with which his own ship became entangled, when a general attack was made by the whole Greek line to defend Aminias, and the battle was begun.¹

We come now to the important question of the position of each fleet when this first collision took place. Here I have been persuaded, chiefly by the argument of Rhediades, to change my opinion as to the position of the Greeks. We have only one distinct statement as to the Greek line: this is in Diodorus (Ephorus), and it now seems to me to be the one which best reconciles the other accounts of the battle. According to this, the line was formed between Salamis and the Heracleum.² The Heracleum was a sanctuary which belonged to a district including Piraeus, Phalerum, Xypete, and Thymaetadae, hence called

¹ *Ibid.* 84: οὕτω δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀμεινίῃ βοηθόντες συνέμσγον.

² Diod. II, 18: οὗτοι (the Greeks) τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον συναχθέντες ἐξέπλευσαν, καὶ τὸν πόρον μεταξὺ Σαλαμῖνος καὶ Ἡρακλείου κατεῖχον. In my former paper (p. 256) I was persuaded by the authority of Strabo (p. 325) and Ctesias (*Persic.* § 57, 26) to place the Heracleum wrongly near Perama (opposite the island of St. George), where the ferry crossed (and still crosses) to Salamis. See Rhediades, pp. 5, 6.

the Ἡράκλειον τετράκωμον. The temple probably stood near the small bay south of the eastern end of Aegaleos, and near it Xerxes had his seat, from which he watched the battle. The Greek line when the battle opened must have extended from A, near the point of Cynosura, to some point near that at which B stands in the map. The Persians had now passed the narrows between Psyttaleia and Attica, and were rapidly approaching the Greeks. After the establishment of the blockade in the night, they had watched for some movement of the Greeks to escape from Salamis, but all in vain. When the day broke, they were alarmed by hearing the song of battle chanted by the Greeks and reëchoed from the rocks of Salamis; for this was no sign of flight, but the shout of brave men eager for battle. Soon after this the fleet of the Greeks rowed forth from the two bays, and quickly they were all in full sight of the Persians. The last words (Aesch. *Pers.* 398), *θὼς δὲ πάντες ἦσαν ἐκφανεῖς ἰδεῖν*, make it perfectly clear that the Greeks were not visible to the Persians until they had advanced some distance from the place at which the fleet was lying when the crews embarked. This verse could not have been written by one who knew that the fleet had been in full view for at least an hour on the other side of the bay directly opposite.¹ The moment of this sudden vision of the advancing Greeks was probably when the Persians emerged from behind Psyttaleia as they entered the straits, and the Greeks came in sight beyond Cynosura as they rowed forth from the two harbors of Salamis. As Aeschylus tells us,² the Greek right wing in the bay nearest to Cynosura came forth first, slowly and in good order: they probably waited at the point of Cynosura while the Athenians and the rest of the left wing from the more distant bay came forth more rapidly, and wheeled round to the right so that, when they were come into line off Cynosura, they formed a single line, running about E.N.E. with the right wing which was there awaiting them. With this array they met the lines of Persians which were now emerging from the straits in several parallel lines directly facing them.³

¹ See above, p. 78.

² *Pers.* 399-401.

³ I am convinced by the argument of Rhediades that the Persians entered the straits in several short lines, described by Aeschylus as *ῥεῦμα* and by Diodorus as *τάξις*, which had to be made still shorter as they passed the narrower parts, — and not in a

In the absence of any reference to more than one Greek line, I have assumed that there was but one. But we have distinct mention of several Persian lines in our accounts. Aeschylus describes the Persians as moving from their blockading stations into the inner bay in a stream (*ῥεύμα*), which at first held its own (*ἀντεῖχεν*), that is, in the open sea before it entered the narrows between Psyttaleia and Attica. But then the multitude of ships were crowded in the straits, and fell into helpless confusion, dashing into one another and crushing the banks of their oars, so that they soon became an easy prey to the skilfully managed Greek ships.¹ Diodorus adds to this, that at first the Persians kept their line as they sailed in, having plenty of open room (i. e. outside of the narrows); but when they entered the straits, they were obliged to remove some of the ships from their line, and this caused great confusion.² Herodotus distinctly recognized several lines of Persian ships, when he says that, when the front line was put to flight, those behind them tried to push forward with their ships and were met by their own retreating vessels.³

We do not know whether the Persians on emerging from the straits attempted to extend their front by any new movement. Nor do we know whether the ships which were blockading the narrow passage between Psyttaleia and Salamis, or any of them, approached the Greeks by that passage and then helped to extend their lines westward north of Psyttaleia. Rhediades assumes without question that the latter was done: if it was not, the Persian front must have been at a great disadvantage in meeting the longer Greek line. These details become quite unimportant in view of the skilful tactics of the Greeks in taking advantage of the helpless condition of the Persians after the battle began. Aeschylus and Herodotus agree that the battle was begun by an Athenian ship, which (as Aeschylus adds) disabled its Phoenician

column, as I formerly thought. The passage is less than 4000 feet wide, so that the large fleet cannot be thought of as passing between the rocky shores in three lines: *Pers.* 366 refers only to the arrangements for the night blockade.

¹ *Pers.* 412-420.

² Diod. II, 18: τὸ μὲν πρῶτον πλείοντες διετῆρουν τὴν τάξιν, ἔχοντες πολλὴν εὐρυχωρίαν· ὡς δ' εἰς τὸ στενὸν ἦλθον, ἡναγκάζοντο τῶν νεῶν τινὰς ἀπὸ τῆς τάξεως ἀποσπᾶν, καὶ πολλὴν ἐποιοῦν θόρυβον.

³ Hdt. 8, 89.

opponent.¹ This was the signal for a general conflict. Herodotus gives no further continuous account of the progress of the battle; and the description of Aeschylus shows only that the Persians were hopelessly broken up by their unskilful passage of the straits, and were at the mercy of the Greeks, who took every possible advantage of their confusion. The Greeks surrounded them and dashed into them from all sides; while the Persians were at the same time hopelessly disabled by their own ships striking them with their sharp beaks and crushing their banks of oars. This ended in a general disorderly flight of all that remained of the Persian fleet. Night alone closed the scene of slaughter.²

Diodorus gives more particulars, which may be in great part authentic. He states that the Persian admiral led his line, and was the first to make an attack, i. e. from the Persian side. He fell after fighting brilliantly. His ship was sunk, and this threw the Persian fleet into confusion. There were then many in command; but they each gave different orders. Therefore they ceased advancing, and began to retreat into the open sea. The Athenians, seeing their confusion, rushed upon them, and rammed some with their beaks and swept away the oars from others. As they could not use their oars, many exposed their sides to the beaks of the enemy and were severely damaged. Therefore they gave up the attempt to escape by backing water, and turned and fled in headlong speed. Diodorus adds that only 40 Greek ships were destroyed, while the Persians lost more than 200, besides those which were captured with their crews.³

I have postponed the discussion of a difficult question concerning the two wings of the Persian fleet, to avoid interrupting the discussion of other matters which seem to me more important to the understanding of the battle itself. Herodotus (8, 76) says that Xerxes, during the night before the battle, sent his "west wing" round Salamis to block the north passage. I assumed, as a matter of course, that this designation referred to the position in which the Persian fleet was drawn up in line of battle (*διαταχθέντες*) the day previous, in preparation for a sea-

¹ *Pers.* 409-411; Hdt. 8, 84.

² *Pers.* 417-432. See p. 83 (above).

³ Diod. 11, 18 and 19; see also Hdt. 8, 89.

fight the next day (8, 70); and I supposed this line to extend from about east to west somewhere south of Psyttaleia and the long point of Salamis. My only reason for placing the line there was that the rest of the line after the west wing was sent away was said by Herodotus to be lying ἀμφὶ τὴν Κέον τε καὶ Κυνόσουραν, which (as we have no idea where Κέος was) was probably south of Cynosura, the long point of Salamis. I still think this to be correct, as the first line of battle formed after the ships left Phalerum seems to designate the position of the wings much more naturally than the line of the Attic shore, to which Wheeler refers it. I confess I cannot understand Wheeler's severe charge of inconsistency against my calling different ends of the Persian line the "west wing" on two successive days. We must remember that the "west wing" sent round Salamis the night before the battle could not have been in the battle itself at all, so that in any case the "west wing" in the battle must have been a different body of ships from this.

The passage of Herodotus with which my previous use of "west wing" is thought to be inconsistent is found in 8, 85, after an intermission of eight chapters devoted mainly to an account of the doings of the Greeks on Salamis the night before the battle: κατὰ μὲν δὴ Ἀθηναίους ἐτετάχατο Φοίνικες (οὗτοι γὰρ εἶχον τὸ πρὸς Ἐλευσινός τε καὶ ἑσπέρης κέρας)· κατὰ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους Ἴωνες (οὗτοι δ' εἶχον τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἡώ τε καὶ τὸν Πειραιέα). *Opposite the Athenians were posted the Phoenicians (for these held the west wing towards Eleusis): and opposite the Lacedaemonians (were posted) the Ionic Greeks (and these held the wing toward the east and the Piraeus).* Here οὗτοι has (so far as I know) always been referred to the Phoenicians and the Ionians, until Rhediades, apparently without thinking of any other interpretation, referred them to the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians.¹ It will be noticed that this brief mention of the two wings directly follows a long account of the plans of the Greeks and their preparations for the battle, with no direct mention of the Persian movements. And it does not introduce any further account of these. I feel very strongly inclined to adopt this view of Rhediades: οὗτοι in parenthesis can quite natur-

¹ See Rhediades, pp. 23-26. The chief objection to this view seems to me to be the reference of αὐτῶν in the following clause to the Ionians; but the disregard of the parenthesis here may easily be pardoned.

ally be referred to Ἀθηναίους and Λακεδαιμονίους, which are made the more prominent by μὲν δὴ and δὲ; and we thus have a reference to the two wings of the Greeks in the two harbors of Salamis, which were lying, before they went out to the battle, precisely as they are described. If this view is not adopted, I think we must explain the terms "west" and "east" with reference to some position taken by the Persian fleet just after it left Phalerum on the day before the battle, when it may have been at first arranged in a line of which the Phoenicians occupied the west or northwest end.¹

Diodorus states that the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were on the left Greek wing, and the Aeginetans and Megarians on the right, while Herodotus puts the Lacedaemonians on the right, where they belonged by virtue of their ἡγεμονία. Diodorus places the Phoenicians on the right Persian wing opposite the Athenians, and the Ionians on the left: he never calls the wings *east* and *west*.² Rhediades³ ingeniously accounts for the discrepancy about the Lacedaemonians by supposing that they changed places with the Aeginetans during the manoeuvres by which the two wings, which came from the two small bays at the same time, were united in one line off Cynosura just before the battle began.² Herodotus mentions an Aeginetan ship attacking an Ionian ship on the Persian left.⁴ Herodotus gives an interesting account of the time when the Persians had taken to flight and were sailing off to Phalerum: then the Athenians in the confusion rammed the enemy's ships which were still in the conflict, while the Aeginetans stationed themselves in the narrow channel, and any ships which escaped the Athenians at once fell into the hands of the Aeginetans.⁵ The Aeginetans received the first honors of the sea-fight, and the Athenians the second.⁶

Both Aeschylus and Herodotus narrate the final act of the Greeks, who landed on Psyttaleia and put to death all the noble Persians who

¹ This seems to be what Wheeler approves in p. 132, where he says that "the Persian fleet is always spoken of in terms of the Attic shore against which it was drawn up on the day before the battle." In p. 130 he speaks of this arrangement as being made "in the open sea off Peiraieus."

² Diod. 11, 17 and 18.

³ See Rhediades, pp. 34, 35.

⁴ 8, 90.

⁵ 8, 91.

⁶ 8, 93.

had been landed there the day before. Herodotus mentions Aristides as the leader in this merciless slaughter.¹

After the battle the Greeks towed to Salamis the wrecks which still remained in the bay, and prepared for another sea-fight which they expected would soon follow. But a west wind drove many of the wrecks over to the shore of Colias on the Attic coast a few miles southeast of Phalerum.²

In stating my views of the battle of Salamis in this new form, I have given the arguments on the chief points in greater detail than before, especially those which appear to me to show that none of our ancient authorities support the common view of the position of the Persian fleet along the Attic coast opposite the town of Salamis. To make this as clear as possible and to avoid all possibility of unfairness in presenting the evidence, I have given what I believe to be a true account of all that we find in Aeschylus and Herodotus bearing on the question at issue, with the full text and a translation of the important passages. Then follows my own account of what I believe to have been the real course of events during the day and night before the battle and in the battle itself, always referring to our two chief authorities and also to what is added to the testimony by Plutarch and Diodorus. I wish to avoid the censure cast upon my earlier paper by Wheeler, who calls it "rather an attempt at reconciling with the Aeschylean account two conflicting passages in Herodotus than any attempt at reconciling the two accounts taken as whole." "The account of Herodotus," he adds, "must be interpreted as a whole." But this process, which in my opinion is the only fair one, has necessarily caused repetition, which I have tried to avoid as much as was possible with a due regard to my main object.

¹ 8, 95.

² 8, 96.